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Abstract: The article provide a short explanation of 
the current legal framework after regulation n. 
316/2014 on transfer of technology agreements and 
related Guidelines. In its second part it focuses on the 
antirust treatment of patent pools with particular accent 
on Huawei case. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The general antitrust framework for technology 
transfer agreements within the European 
Union has changed recently, although not 
significantly, with the entry into force of the 
new block exemption regulation and new 
guidelines on the application of article 101 
TFEU to technology transfer agreements3. 
Because of the strategic importance of 
cooperation in the field of technology markets, 
                                                 
1 Università degli Studi di Torino (par. 5-11) 
2 Università degli Studi di Brescia Health & Wealth (par. 
1-4). 
 3 PAZZI, Revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Rules, 
in 2 Italian Antitrust Review, 2014,153, considers 
“incremental changes” those of the revised regime. 
the creation of a clear and consistent system of 
competition rules is a pre-condition of 
economic success of European companies, as 
well as a source of attractiveness for foreign 
companies willing to start a cooperation in 
Europe or with European counterparts. 
The rationale behind the European antitrust 
framework for technology transfer agreements 
is one that is common to other jurisdictions. 
The assumption is that technology transfer 
agreements favor competition by allowing 
parties to share on technology markets 
fundamental inputs for production; moreover, 
licensing is supposed to fix allocative 
inefficiencies related to the competitive nature 
of parallel innovative processes by several 
actors. At the same time, as any other business-
to-business transaction, whether it occurs 
between competitors or between parties that 
do not compete on the same market, a 
technology transaction has always a potential 
restrictive effect on competition and possible 
negative outcomes for consumers. 
This article provides a short explanation of the 
current regulatory framework, which is only 
incrementally new with respect to the pre-
existing situation, and will focus on the 
antitrust treatment of patent pools. 
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2. THE BLOCK EXEMPTION 
REGULATION. MAJOR CHANGES 
AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
The new regulatory framework for technology 
transfer agreement is based on two sets of rules 
though the first is mandatory and the second a 
soft law only: the block exemption regulation, 
on the one side, the Guidelines on the other 
side4. This framework will remain stable for a 
number of years; alike its predecessors, 
Regulation 316/2014 will naturally expire in 
2026. Although amendments and corrections 
are always possible, this temporal horizon 
provides for a much more reliable ground for 
firms. 
Apart from the extended duration of the safe 
harbor, Regulation 316/2014 presents a lighter 
version of an already tested antitrust approach 
based on market share thresholds to determine 
whether bilateral technology transfer 
agreements can fall outside the scope of art. 
101.1 TFEU. The framework of analysis is 
further simplified, because the Regulation 
considers now only two situations: when 
parties are competing undertakings and when 
they are not. The market share thresholds are 
20% and 30% of the relevant market(s) 
                                                 
4 Initial comments on the new technology transfer block 
exemption regulation include S. RAB, New EU Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption: A Note of Caution, in Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 2015, 1, and S. 
BARAZZA, The Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation and related Guidelines: competition law and IP 
licensing in the EU, 9 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice 186 (2014). 
respectively (art. 3). A set of hardcore 
restrictions listed in art. 4 causes an agreement, 
which could benefit from the safe harbor, to 
fall outside the provision of art. 2 (vitiatur et 
vitiant). Hardcore provisions are considered 
dangerous as their objects have intolerable 
restrictive effects. Even a cursory reading of 
the blacklist confirms that such provisions 
concern limitation of output, restriction on 
pricing for licensees in selling the contract 
product downstream, allocation of markets or 
customers, and other restrictions that prevent 
licensees or third parties to conduct further 
research and development or to exploit 
potentially competing technologies. 
Art. 5 lists the restrictions that cannot be 
exempted when contained in technology 
transfer agreements even if they do not impact 
the validity of the agreements (vitiatur sed non 
vitiant). Such restrictions are now limited to two 
very common terms of license agreements, 
such as: 
i) exclusive grant-backs or obligations to assign 
to the licensor improvements or new 
applications of the licensed technologies 
developed by the licensee, and  
ii) no-challenge clauses. With respect to no-
challenge clauses, art. 5 has been modified and 
it now makes compatible with the block 
exemption the contractual term by which the 
licensor can terminate an exclusive license in 
the event the licensee challenges the validity of 
any of the licensed technology rights. Such 
contractual term is typically employed in 
bilateral arrangements to prevent opportunistic 
behaviors by licensees when the licensor 
entirely depends on the other party for the 
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exploitation of the technology, such as typically 
in exclusive dealings5. 
Importantly, technology transfer agreements 
that also contain terms and conditions that 
apply to a level of trade other than that of 
licensor and licensee are also caught by the 
Regulation, although they have to comply with 
Regulation 330/2010 if they refer to 
distribution. 
3. THE GUIDELINES  
The Regulation 316/2014 only applies to 
bilateral agreements and, among those, to 
technology transfer agreements that comply 
with its requirements. All other agreements are 
not automatically caught by art. 101.1, but can 
be individually exempted if they satisfy the 
conditions of art. 101.3. To the purposes of the 
individual assessment, and to also guide the 
interpretation of Regulation 316/2014, the 
regulatory framework includes the Guidelines 
of the application of art. 101 to technology 
transfer agreements. 
Because of the complexity of technology 
transactions and the recurrence of multi-party 
agreements that do not fit the easy features of 
bilateral licensing deals, the Guidelines will 
prove even more useful to provide a clear and 
reliable framework for the antitrust assessment 
of such arrangements6. Indeed, the Guidelines 
                                                 
5 PAZZI¸op. cit., 155. 
6 RAB, op. cit., 14. 
also deal with specific issues and cases, such as 
those of settlement agreements and patent 
pools. The remainder of this article will focus 
on patent pools, as one of the distinctive 
features of the contemporary markets for 
technology and an efficient way to clear 
blocking situations in a world of growing 
anticommons. 
4. PATENT POOLS. WHAT IS NEW? 
Since technology pools are not covered by the 
TTBER (whereas n. 7), it ensues the necessity of 
highlighting their treatment under the European 
competition rules in order “to provide adequate 
legal security for undertakings” (whereas n. 3)7. 
Patent pools were already mentioned in the 
previous EU discipline mainly contained in the 
Guidelines of April 27,2004 (points from 210 
through 235)8, but in the updated version the 
paragraphs are increased in numbers (from 244 
through 273) and are more detailed in their 
content. It is worth noting, all in all, that in 
many aspects the EU Guidelines reflect the 
American judicial experience and echoes the 
                                                 
7 The new regulation applies as from April 30, 2015 for 
those agreements in force as of April 30, 2014 and 
therefore-in my opinion- also the relative Guidelines ( in 
so far as they contemplate new rules) start to apply from 
the same date. 
8 For a first and short presentation see FRIGNANI, 
PIGNATA, Il nuovo regolamento n. 772/2004 del 27 aprile 
2004 sugli accordi di trasferimento di tecnologia, in Dir. comm. 
int., 2004, 662-665. 
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DOJ Guidelines for the licensing of intellectual 
property, issued on April 6, 19959. 
According to the Guidelines, Technology pools 
are defined as arrangements whereby two or 
more parties assemble a package of technology 
which is licensed not only to contributors to 
the pool but also to third parties. In terms of 
their structure technology pools can take the 
form of simple arrangements between a limited 
number of parties or of elaborate organizational 
arrangements whereby the organization of the 
licensing of the pooled technologies is entrusted 
to a separate entity. In both cases the pool may 
allow licensees to operate on the market on the 
basis of a single license (point 244)10.  
However, the new regime seems a little bit 
more restrictive11: the Commission justifies it 
with the experience developed so far12 and with 
the comfort of the majority of reports collected 
from the stakeholders in the two public 
consultations of 201213 and 201314 that were 
launched before the new legal framework. 
                                                 
9 Available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm
#t55. More information, through short survey, by 
COLANGELO, Mercato e cooperazione tecnologica. I contratti di 
patent pooling, Milano, 2008, 200. 
10 It is the same definition already offered in the 
Guidelines 2004. 
11 It contains “Incremental changes” as PAZZI, Revised 
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Rules, in 2 Italian 
Antitrust Review, 2014,153 defines them. 
12 Not very extensive indeed. 
13Available at  
http://www.ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/20
12/_technology_transfer/index_en.html. 
Picking up the more important cases: 
1) Case MPMG in 200115, where a pool 
collecting the technology for digital 
broadcasting (audio and video) was approved 
by the Commission. The patents were licensed 
through a single, non-exclusive license program 
and licensees remained free to negotiate 
licenses outside the portfolio from any 
participating patent holder. 
2) Case DVD in 200016, where the Commission 
had cleared an agreement whereby some of the 
companies that developed the DVD (Digital 
Versatile Disc) technology pooled their 
respective patents. The agreement allowed 
interested manufacturers to obtain a license for 
all necessary DVD patents rapidly, leading to 
lower administration and transactions costs 
which ought to benefit also the consumer. 
3) Case SLA in 200317, where the Commission 
cleared the agreement subject, among others, to 
                                                 
14Available at http://wc.europa.eu/competition/ 
consultations/2013_technology_transfer/index_en.html.  
15 COMP /C-38143, in Official Journal, June 19, 2001, C 
174/6. 
16 Press release IP/00/1135 October 9, 2000. The 
agreement consisted of a “Patent Pool” for patents covering 
applications of DVD technology. Certain holders of 
essential patents had agreed to license their patents through 
a single non-exclusive and non-discriminatory license 
program.  
The investigation carried out by the Commission's 
competition services found that this patent pool would 
helped promote technical and economic progress by 
allowing quick and efficient introduction of the DVD 
technology. It was also found that the agreement does not 
contain unnecessary or excessive restrictions on 
competition.  
17 Press release IP/03/1152 of August 7, 2003. 
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these conditions: the SLA should concern only 
patents essential for the production of standard 
pre-recorded CD; an independent expert 
should be appointed to certify the essential 
nature of the patent; the pool members should 
be free to license their respective patents 
separately.  
4) Case Motorola in April 201418. The company 
had committed itself to grant licenses on 
FRAND terms, but asked for an exceptionally 
high royalty. Apple, considering this a refusal, 
started manufacturing the product covered by 
the patent without having obtained the relative 
license. Motorola sought for an injunction 
against Apple before a German court on the 
basis of a smartphone standard essential patent 
notwithstanding that it has committed himself 
to license it on FRAND terms and the licensee 
was willing to take a license on such terms. 
Considering the facts in the case at hand the 
Commission found that seeking such an 
injunction constituted an abuse of dominant 
position. 
However, the Commission decided not to 
impose a fine on Motorola because there was 
no case law by the EU Courts dealing with the 
legality under art.102 of SEP-based injunctions 
and that national courts had so far reached 
diverging conclusions on this question. 
5) Case Samsung in 201419. Samsung was the 
owner of various SEPs for the standard UMTS 
(Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
Service) and committed to license them on 
                                                 
18 Press release IP/14/489 of April 29, 2014 
19 Case AT.39939 in Official Journal April 29, 2014. 
FRAND terms. On April 2011, Samsung 
sought preliminary and permanent injunctions 
against Apple in numerous European 
jurisdictions including France, Italy, Holland, 
UK. The Commission raised concerns as to the 
compatibility of seeking such injunctions with 
art.102 TFEU. On September 27, 2013, 
Samsung offered some initial commitments: i) 
not to seek injunctive relief before any Court 
against a potential licensee that agrees to a 
licensing framework which provides for a 
negotiation period of up to twelve months for 
the determination of FRAND terms and 
conditions and, in case of default agreement, a 
third party determination by arbitration or 
Court; ii) a trustee would be appointed to 
monitor Samsung’s compliance with this 
commitments. These commitments have been 
considered insufficient by the Commission to 
avoid its concerns, based also on critical issues 
raised by eighteen interested parties. At the 
end, the case was closed with these further final 
commitments considered adequate by the 
Commission: 
i) in case parties do not agree on the venue of a 
third party determination, only specialized 
Courts should be competent with preference 
over arbitration; the non-confidential version 
of FRAND determinations by arbitration 
should be made public; eligible as arbitrators 
should be also people from a broader field of 
specialization20; 
                                                 
20 No doubt these conditions cannot hide a certain 
dislike of arbitration by the Commission: we propose 
ourselfs to deal with this topic in another contribution. 
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ii) the commitments will not alter the burden of 
proof under applicable law with the respect to 
validity, infringement, and essentiality of the 
mobile SEPs in question; 
iii) the invitation to negotiate must contain a 
minimum of information and a proposed 
duration for the licensee of no less than five 
years. 
Both last cases concerned a one-company SEP 
and not a SEP within a technology pool. 
Although the closing of the case occurred on 
April 29, that is one month after the 
publication the Guidelines, their outcome may 
be considered a previous experience of the 
Commission since the relative procedure had 
been running for years.  
Italian case law has not been absent in this 
worldwide debate. Let us quote some cases: 
i) Tribunal of Genoa, orders of 7 May 2004, 14 
October 2004 and 15 November 200421, 
Koninkijke Philips Electronic N.V. vs Computer 
Support Italcard s.r.l. and Computer Support Italcard 
vs Koninkijke Philips Electronic N.V. 
All these three decisions concerned the same 
issues arising from a the facto standards on the 
production of CD-RWs (re-writable). Having 
ascertained the dominant position, the Tribunal 
consequently decided that the relative standard 
imposes on the owners the obligation to 
contract with others producers22, provided that 
                                                 
21 The decision is published in Diritto industriale, 2005, 
500, with a note of M. GRANIERI, Proprietà intellettuale, 
standard di fatto e obbligo di licenza. 
22 To reach this conclusion the judges referred 
specifically to the “essential facility” doctrine. 
they had previously contacted the owners to 
obtain a license on reasonable terms. 
ii) Tribunal of Milan, October 18, November 2, 
2011, Ical, Car Mania Multimedia, Ital Video 
International vs Rovi Guides and United Video 
Properties. 
The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction 
against an undertaking that exploited a patent 
without previously negotiating licenses. The 
defendants counterclaimed that the products of 
the plaintiff illegally exploited their patents, 
because they did not ask for a license. The case 
regarded the validity of the patents at hand as 
well as the conditions of a FRAND license 
provided that the patent could give rise to a the 
facto standard. In the pre-trial phase the judge 
granted a provisional seizure of the infringing 
products distributed on the market against 
undertakings exploiting the patents without 
previously negotiation and obtaining a license 
from the owner. An expert was appointed with 
the mission to ascertain the validity of the 
patent as well as it qualification as SEP. The 
dispute is pending on the merits. 
iii) Tribunal of Milan, Samsung vs. Apple23.  
The case represents the Italian side of the 
Samsung vs Apple war blown up worldwide 
concerning the iPhone 4S. The case 
contemplated a range of different issues going 
from pure patent law until antitrust rules, in 
particular whether a SEP owner is in a 
dominant position and, in the affirmative case, 
what are its obligations towards an undertaking 
                                                 
23 The case is still pending.  
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seeking a licenses. In the case of a provisional 
proceedings the judge of the Tribunal of Milan 
refused to grant any interim relief, because it 
implied a previous decision on pre-conditions, 
like the nature of the standard, the extension of 
the patent, the existence of a dominant position 
and other issues. An expert had been 
appointed, with the aim to determine the 
FRAND conditions for a license. The case did 
not reach a decision on the merits since the 
parties reached a settlement agreement within 
the scope of a worldwide agreement24. 
5. THE ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF 
PATENT POOLS. PATENT 
AGGREGATION STRUCTURES AND 
THEIR ROLES 
The Guidelines recognize that «technology pools 
can produce pro-competitive effects»25 in particular by 
reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit 
on cumulative royalties to avoid double 
marginalization26. 
More specifically other advantages (in terms of 
competition or efficiency) are the following: for 
the patent owners, pools allow owners of 
                                                 
24 An extensive description of these cases, not yet 
reported, is offered by TAVASSI, Standard, IP rights and 
competition: balance or conflict ( Report to the XI Treviso 
conference 2014) in Antitrust between EU Law and national 
law, Bruylant Giuffrè, 2015, 150-162.  
25 Point 245. 
26 These words echoe the definition of MELAMED, 
LERCH, Uncertain Patents, Antitrust and Patent Pools, in The 
Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Law, 2007, 277.  
patents of minor importance to escape 
isolation; for the prospective licensees pools 
avoid long researches and risks of forgetting to 
obtain license from one of the thousands of 
patents that are nowadays required for the 
production of complex product, such as 
smartphones or computers. 
The history of patent pools goes back to the 
last quarter of XIX century27, but their impact 
on the transfer of technology (and thus on the 
market economy in general) has grown up as 
highly relevant in the last decades of the XX 
century28. 
The patent pools raise, grow up and mature in 
a pure patent or in intellectual property 
environment (technology protection, in a broad 
meaning). This recognition excludes that the 
first purpose of patent pools is to pursue an 
anticompetitive object, which however may 
occur as a possible effect.  
Among scholars (both economists and jurists) 
there is a convergence on the understanding 
about the following goals pursued by the patent 
pools: 
i) lowering transaction costs; 
                                                 
27 MOSSOFF, The rise and fall of the first American Patent 
Thicket: the sewing machine war of the 1850s, in 53 Ariz. L. 
Rev., 2011; 165 GILBERT, Antitrust for Patent Pools: a century 
of policy evolution, in Stan. Tech. L. Rev., 2004, 3 available at: 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_3.  
28 For a more detailed account in law and economics 
perspective, see GRANIERI, Soluzioni contrattuali agli 
anticommons (pooling, collecting, standards). Esperienze europee e 
statunitensi a confronto, in Annali italiani del diritto d’autore, 
2013, 277. 
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ii) to speed up the process of getting licenses 
which include the whole necessary 
technology29;  
iii) to avoid the marginalization of the owner of 
the less important technology (which is often 
the smallest undertaking member contributing 
to the pool), thus allowing to some extent 
recovery of R&D expenditures30; 
iv) to avoid the leverage effect on the last 
necessary license (hold up problem);  
v) to reduce a plurality of royalties to a 
cumulative one31. 
Patent pools must be analyzed in conjunction 
with new institutional mechanisms that emerge 
on the market, by way of specialization, to 
enforce patents in the pools. 
a) American authors32 have formulated the 
category of so called “offensive non-practicing 
entities” (NPE), whose business model does 
not consist in the production of goods or 
services33, but in the management of the 
                                                 
29 MASTRELIA, Standard, patent pool e gruppi di acquisto di 
brevetti. Verso un nuovo modello di trasferimento di tecnologia nel 
settore hi-tech, in Dir. ind., 2013, 522. 
30 Usually such undertaking is the owner of a 
“substitutable patent”. 
31 SHAPIRO, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, 
Patent Pools and Standard Setting, in JAFFE, LERNER, STERN 
(eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press , 2001, 
119 ff.  
32 Among many see WANG, Rise of Patent Intermediaries, in 
25 Berkeley Tech. L.J.,2010, 159-182.  
33 Which should pertain to the developers of technology, 
protected by IPR, with some exceptions for the 
technology developed by entities or institutions of pure 
research, like universities. 
packaged intellectual property rights and in 
enforcing the patents with the purpose of 
forcing licensing agreements and collecting 
royalties. The notion of offensive NPE does 
not represent correctly the reality, because the 
activity of seeking an injunctive relief against 
the infringers of the rights in the pool 
represents an agency activity on behalf of 
technologies’ owners which is contingent to 
prosecute those who do not wish to obtain 
licenses or ceased to pay royalties. Hence, the 
business goal is not to harm other 
undertakings, but it is rather to increase 
earnings by means of licensing royalties. 
On the other hand, the emerge of these third 
entities (the so called “patent trolls”) is a 
question of convenience, as it is shown at point 
244 of the Guidelines which do not make any 
difference between the case of a direct 
organization by the pool members and the case 
when licensing out of the pool technology is 
entrusted to a separate entity. 
b) More recently the same scholarship has 
formulated the notion of “defensive NPE” 
which describes third entities in charge of 
collecting the IP rights in order to license them 
out and prosecuting the infringers of the 
patents, safeguarding the technology holders 
from the risk of expensive (and with uncertain 
outcome) judicial retaliations or reputational 
harm34. 
The benefit of differentiating the two above 
categories of NPEs, from the competition 
                                                 
34 ORR, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms and the Limited 
Role of Antitrust, in 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2013. 
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point of view is almost null because it rather 
emphasizes one or the other among the basic 
purposes of the pool, which in general terms 
are equipped to pursue both of them.  
The technology pools may serve the purpose of 
overcoming the so called “patent crisis”35, 
which is linked to blocking patents situations: 
using the patent rights to seek an injunction 
against an infringer is nothing less than re-
affirming the importance, in a modern economy, 
of IPR function. The burning problem arises 
when an injunctive relief granted on a specific 
patent blocks the exploitation of a set of other 
patents which are inseparably linked with it (that 
is, essential to the pooled technology). 
From the opposite perspective, technology 
pools may also be restrictive of competition. 
The creation of the pools «necessarily implies 
joint selling of the pools technologies…which 
may amount to price fixing cartel» (Guidelines 
point 246). Among the parties, it may restrain 
competition by reducing innovation, foreclosing 
alternative technologies. Such conclusion depicts 
an exception to what usually occurs: pools 
(almost) never limit the members’ freedom to 
innovate or to develop new technologies. Having 
said that, the Guidelines are concerned to avoid 
these possible competition restraints. 
The concern of anticompetitive restrictions 
covers both: i) the formation of technology 
                                                 
35 BURK, LEMLEY, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts can 
Solve it, Univ. Chicago Press, 2009. «Patent pools as an 
alternative to patent wars», to borrow the title from an 
article by BEDNARK AND INEICHEN, , in Intellectual 
Property and Technology Law Journal, 2004, 1.  
pools and ii) its operation (agreements between 
the pool and its licensees). 
6. VARIOUS CATEGORIES  
With the aim of avoiding the possible 
competition restraints above mentioned, the 
Guidelines make use of different notions based 
on economic criteria, here used to properly 
assess the effects of pools on competition. 
Technological complements: when two technologies 
«are both required to produce the product or 
carry out the process to which the technologies 
relate» (point 251). 
Technological substitutes: «when either technology 
allows the holder to produce the product or 
carry out the process to which the technologies 
relate» (point 251). 
Essential technology: necessary «to produce a 
particular product (…) or in accordance with a 
standard which includes the pooled technology 
(…) if there are no viable substitutes (…)» 
(point 252).  
Non-essential technology: if there are viable 
substitutes (both from a commercial and 
technical point of view) inside or outside the 
pool. 
Such different notions represent different levels 
of anticompetitive risks if the related patents 
become part of the pool; therefore the 
Commission lays down different conditions for 
their admissibility. 
We start with point 261, headed “Safe 
harbour”, which lists the 7 conditions whose 
fulfillment permits the formation and operation 
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of a pool to fall outside art.101.1 irrespective of 
the market position of the parties: 
“The creation and operation of the pool, including the 
licensing out, generally falls outside Article 101(1) of 
the Treaty, irrespective of the market position of the 
parties, if all the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) participation in the pool creation process is open to 
all interested technology rights owners; 
(b) sufficient safeguards are adopted to ensure that only 
essential technologies (which therefore necessarily are also 
complements) are pooled; 
(c) sufficient safeguards are adopted to ensure that 
exchange of sensitive information (such as pricing and 
output data) is restricted to what is necessary for the 
creation and operation of the pool; 
(d) the pooled technologies are licensed into the pool on a 
non-exclusive basis; 
(e) the pooled technologies are licensed out to all 
potential licensees on FRAND terms; 
(f) the parties contributing technology to the pool and the 
licensees are free to challenge the validity and the 
essentiality of the pooled technologies, and; 
(g) the parties contributing technology to the pool and the 
licensee remain free to develop competing products and 
technology”. 
 
While the last three conditions concern the 
operation of the pool, all others refer to the 
creation of it. This list, which is new in respect 
to the old Guidelines, is certainly a welcome 
clarification to the benefit of pool members, 
although some conditions may prove too rigid. 
If the technology pool comprises non essential 
but complementary patents, the Commission is 
less strict but will take into consideration in 
overall assessment, inter alia, all these factors:  
“ a) where there are pro-competitive reasons to include 
non essential technologies in the pool, for example to 
avoid the costs of assessing the essentiality of thousand of 
technologies; 
b) whether licensors remain free to license their respective 
technologies independently; 
c) whether the licensees may obtain a package 
comprising only a part of the technology pooled36;  
d) where the license agreements are of relatively long 
duration and the pooled technology serves a standard, 
whether the licensees can terminate at reasonable notice 
part of the license and obtain a corresponding reduction 
of royalties (point 264).”. 
7. ASSESSMENT OF THE FORMATION 
OF THE POOL 
In the assessment of possible competitive risks 
and efficiencies in the formation and 
organization of the pool the Commission will 
look at it from three perspectives: 
a) open participation (to all interested parties): the 
Commission deems it is likely that selection will 
be on the basis of price/quality considerations 
(point 249). I believe that other selection 
criteria should not be considered as pursuing 
anti-competitive goals: the pool is a voluntary 
cooperation to which the patent owners adhere 
for a multiform purpose.  
                                                 
36 The positive result is reduction of royalties. 
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b) selection and nature of the pooled technology: the 
Commission is concerned with the risks for 
competition when the pooled technologies are 
“substitutes”, since «royalties are likely to be 
higher than they would otherwise be, because 
licensees do not benefit from rivalry between 
the technologies in question» (point 253). This 
concern forgets the countervailing balance due 
to reduction in transactional costs and the safe 
harbor from infringement lawsuits likely to 
come from some patent owners. To this aim 
the Commission contemplates the intervention 
of independent experts in the creation and 
operation of the pool, mainly entrusted with 
the selection of essential technologies only 
(point 256). Also this solution may present a 
drawback as it undermines the necessary 
fiduciary relationship which should run the 
cooperation within the pool. 
c) exchange of sensitive information: given the 
necessity to avoid exchange of sensitive 
information between the parties to a pool, the 
devise foreseen by the Guidelines does not 
seem easily “workable”. In fact the 
Commission envisages an “independent expert or 
licensing body” entrusted to ensure that “output 
and sales data, which may be necessary for the purposes 
of calculating and verifying royalties, is not disclosed to 
undertakings that compete on affected market” (point 
259). How can these opposite goals be attained 
remains unclear to me, particularly if the 
decision of the “necessity” of exchange of 
information is entrusted to an “independent 
expert”. 
8. ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS 
BETWEEN THE POOL AND ITS 
LICENSEES 
On this issue the Guidelines lay down a certain 
number of guiding principles which will be 
applied in assessing the individual restraints, 
followed by rules on specific clauses. There is 
no specific guidance as to when the technology 
is included in a standard, although standards 
are mentioned more than once. 
The principles are: 
a) the stronger the market position of the pool 
the greater the risk of anti-competitive effects; 
b) the stronger the market position of the pool, 
the more likely that agreeing not to license to 
all potential licensees or to license on 
discriminatory terms will infringe art.10137; 
c) pools should not unduly foreclose third party 
technology or limit the creation of alternative 
pools; 
d) agreements for licensing out pooled 
technologies should not contain any hardcore 
restrictions, listed in art. 4 of the TTBER, 
namely: determination of prices, limitation of 
output (with one exception); allocation of 
markets or customers (with various exceptions). 
Two final points:  
a) Both licensors and licensees should be free 
to develop competing products and standards 
(point 270). 
                                                 
37 Points a) and b) represent economic considerations for 
competition concern and not a legal guidance. 
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b) Grant back obligations should be non-
exclusive and limited to developments that are 
essential or important to the use of the pooled 
technology (point 271). The acknowledgment 
that also important developments exclude the 
illegality of non-exclusive grant back 
obligations is welcome because it helps 
licensees not to exploit the pooled technology 
behind the terms of the license, although it may 
create difficulties in its application: who is 
burdened to prove the “importance” ? 
9. THE (BURNING) ISSUES WITH 
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT 
(SEP)  
One important aspect is that the relationship 
between competition and the agreements to 
adopt standards was already thoroughly dealt 
with by the Commission in the guidelines on 
horizontal co-operation agreement issued in 
201138 
Though sometimes mentioned, the new 
Guidelines do not deal specifically with the 
setting of a standard and their implication for 
competition. In this context the new Guidelines 
refer to the old ones, without laying down any 
new criteria or limitations. Notwithstanding the 
fact that here lies the very burning issue where 
freedom of contract intersects with freedom of 
competition. 
                                                 
38 Official Journal C-11/1 14, § 7 points from 257 
through 335. See the analysis of TEMPLE LANG, Patent 
Pools and Agreement on Standards, in 36 Eur. L. Rev, 2011, 
887. 
There are two types of standards: de jure and de 
facto (Guidelines point 270): the first are those 
approved by a recognized standard body (like ISO, 
International Organization for Standardization; 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standard 
Institute)39. The standard de facto are constituted by 
the specific technologies developed by 
undertakings which over the time have 
obtained a general recognition and application 
due to their diffusion in the market place. The 
most reliable standard bodies require the patent 
owners to commit themselves to license out on 
FRAND terms40. The violation of such 
commitments are sanctioned within the 
standard body, but this commitment is 
enforced only within the de jure standard (not in 
the context of de facto standard). 
In particular the Guidelines point out that 
standardization agreements usually produce 
significant positive economic effects: for example 
by promoting economic interpenetration on the 
internal market and encouraging the development 
of a new and improved products, and improved 
supply conditions. Standards thus normally 
increase competition and lower output and 
sales costs, benefitting economies as a whole. 
Standards may maintain and enhance quality, 
provide information and ensure interoperability 
                                                 
39 For an account of the legal dynamics of standard 
setting and related problems, see GRANIERI, Attività di 
standardizzazione, diritti di proprietà intellettuale e antitrust, in 
Riv. dir. ind., 2004, I, 138. 
40 For a deeper reading on FRAND licensing, MAUGERI, 
Standardization and Italian Law of Contracts: F/RAND 
Commitments, in Osservatorio del diritto civile e commerciale 
2014, 99. 
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and compatibility (thus increasing value for 
consumers). 
On the opposite side, standard setting can, in 
specific circumstances, also give rise to 
restrictive effects on competition by potentially 
restricting price competition and limiting or 
controlling production, markets, innovation or 
technical development. This might occur 
through three main channels, namely reduction 
in price competition, foreclosure of competing 
innovative technologies and exclusion of, or 
discrimination against, certain companies by 
prevention of effective access to the standard. 
Aware, as they have always been, of the 
possible negative implications for competition 
of defining and managing SEPs, the Standard 
Setting Organization (SSOs) have established, 
on the track of ETSI, Intellectual Property 
Rights Policy, a minimum set of licensing rules 
encapsulated in the acronym FRAND (fair, 
reasonable, non-discriminatory). However soon 
they appeared insufficient because generic and 
non measurable41. Such an uncertainty is an 
incentive to cheating by licensees or 
prospective licensees, as shown in the last cases 
at the EU level42. 
                                                 
41 Reference can be made to SWANSON, BAUMOL, 
Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (Rand) Royalties, Standard 
Selection, and Control of Market Power, in 73 Antitrust L.J., 
2005, 5: «It is widely acknowledges that, in fact, there are 
no generally agreed upon tests to determine whether a 
particular license does or does not satisfy a RAND 
commitment». In fact, in the case Uniloc v. Microsoft, 632 
F.3d 1292 (Fed. Circ. 2011) judges considered as a non 
sense the so called “rule of thumb”, of a royalty of 25% 
as expected earnings. 
42 As COLANGELO, supra, 435, points out, commitments 
are so important and essential as vague in their content. 
However the Guidelines overlook the case of a 
standard set by governments or public 
authorities, thus being legally binding for all 
undertakings that wish to participate in a public 
procurement: if the standard is not complied 
with, the businessmen are excluded from 
access to the public procurement market. 
The burning problem arises in presence of a 
SEP, which gives rise to a dominant position: 
sometimes one-company dominance (cases 
Motorola, Samsung), more frequently collective 
dominance (technology pool). In such a 
circumstance the old principle of obligation to 
negotiate on FRAND terms (fair, reasonable, non-
discriminatory) is unanimously shared43.  
The technology pool is free to negotiate and fix 
the royalties as well as each technology’s share 
of the royalties, provided that licensees must 
remain free to determine the price of products 
produced under the license. Worth to note the 
Commission here accepted to widen the 
possibility of a discussion of the royalties 
within the technology pool and also with future 
licensees, which seemed unclear in the 2011 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, in line 
with a request by legal doctrine44. 
A technology pool sometimes may lead to a 
standard de facto , but not necessarily. If the pool 
enjoys a dominant position, as it is the case 
                                                 
43 HOVENKAMP, Competition in Information Technologies: 
Standard –Essential Patents. Non-Practising Entities and 
FRAND Bidding, in U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper 
No.12-32, 2012. 
44 For example TEMPLE LANG, supra, 890, who 
emphasizes the « need for clarification». 
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with a SEP45, royalties and other licensing 
terms should be non – excessive, non – 
discriminatory and licenses should be non 
exclusive46 The determination whether the 
above conditions are met requires a case by 
case analysis, with the a priori uncertainty like 
applying art. 102 lett.a) and c) TFEU47. 
10. THE CASE HUAWEI–
TECHNOLOGIES/ZTE48 
In general terms the issue to be decided is 
whether an action for infringement brought by 
the SEP-holder against an undertaking which 
manufactures products in accordance with that 
standard constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position. 
The request for a preliminary ruling has been 
made in the course of a dispute between, on 
                                                 
45 For a quick account of problems arising at the 
intersection of intellectual property and antitrust as 
regards SEPs, see GRANIERI, Violazione di brevetti essenziali 
su standard: l’antitrust può essere una difesa?, in A. 
BARTOLINI, D. BRUNELLI, G. CAFORIO, I beni immateriali 
tra regole privatistiche e pubblicistiche, Napoli, 2014, 77. 
46 But the issue is who controls the implementation of 
these criteria? Commission’s answer is: an independent 
expert. 
47 See FRIGNANI, BARIATTI (a cura di), Disciplina della 
concorrenza nella UE, Padova, 2012, 286 ff., 324 ff. 
48 Reference should be made to COLANGELO, Aspettando 
Huawei Technologies: standard, brevetti essenziali ed impegni 
F/Rand, in Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2014, 435 for an 
extensive analysis of all issues involved. The decision of 
the European Court of Justice on July 16, 2015, can be 
read on Foro it., 2015, IV, 477, with a comment of 
COLANGELO, Antitrust, standard ed impegni di licenza: il caso 
Huawei. 
the one hand, Huawei Technologies, a 
multinational group of undertakings active in 
the telecommunications sector, and, on the other, 
ZTE Corp., established in Shenzhen, and ZTE 
Deutschland GmbH, established in Düsseldorf 
(members of a group of undertakings, also 
multinational, operating in the same sector). By 
its action for infringement, Huawei seeks an 
injunction prohibiting the continuation of the 
infringement and an order for the rendering of 
accounts, the recall of products and the 
assessment of damages49. 
It emerges from the order for reference that, 
between November 2010 and the end of March 
2011, Huawei and ZTE engaged in discussions 
relating, inter alia, to the infringement of the 
patent and the possibility of concluding a 
licensing agreement. Huawei named the amount 
which it considered to be a reasonable royalty. 
ZTE ‘ought a cross-licensing agreement. It also 
emerges from the order for reference that, on 
January 30, 2013, ZTE made an offer for a cross-
licensing agreement and proposed, but did not 
pay, a royalty to Huawei. Furthermore, the 
referring court states that «[t]he parties did not 
exchange any specific offers in relation to a 
licensing agreement». On April 28, 2011, 
Huawei brought before the referring court the 
action which has given rise to these preliminary 
ruling proceedings. 
The referring Court points out that the BGH in 
its judgment of May 6, 2009, Orange Book 
                                                 
49 The conduct of SEP-holders who have given a 
commitment to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND 
terms has given rise to a plethora of actions before the 
courts of several Member States and third countries. 
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Standard50 found that where the patent owner 
seeks a prohibitory injunction against a 
defendant who has a claim to a license for that 
patent, patent owner abuses his dominant 
position “only where the following conditions are met”: 
First, the defendant must have made the 
applicant an unconditional offer to conclude a 
licensing agreement (an offer which, specifically, 
must not contain a clause limiting the license 
exclusively to the cases of infringement), it being 
understood that the defendant must consider 
itself bound by that offer and that the applicant 
is obliged to accept it, since its refusal of the 
offer would unfairly hamper the defendant or 
breach the principle of non-discrimination. 
If the defendant considers the amount of 
royalty claimed by the applicant to be excessive, 
or if the applicant refuses to quantify the 
royalty, the offer of an agreement is regarded as 
unconditional if it provides that the applicant is 
to determine the amount of the royalty fairly. 
Secondly, if the defendant is already making 
use of the subject-matter of the patent before 
the applicant accepts its offer, it must meet the 
obligations which, for use of the patent, will be 
incumbent on it under the future licensing 
agreement. That means, in particular, that the 
defendant must render an account for its acts 
of use in accordance with the terms of a non-
discriminatory agreement and that it must meet 
the resulting payment obligations. 
                                                 
50 KZR 39/06 of May 6, 2009. First comment by 
ULLRICH, Patent and Standards. A Comment on the German 
Supreme Court Decision Orange Book Standard, in IIC, 2010, 
337.  
No doubt this position reflects the approach of 
the German judges in favor of intellectual 
property, in line with the ETSI Intellectual 
Property Rights Policy, without any given 
priority to the competition perspective. The 
circumstances of the case at hand show that the 
Court is called to determine the “willing licensee 
test”51. 
In the opinion of Advocate general Wathelet, 
the problems can be resolved in the context of 
other branches of law other than the rules of 
competition law (point 9); at the front line the 
IPR law whose goals are to provide the 
necessary protection of IP to enhance 
investments, innovation52. Another pivotal role 
is played by the law of contracts, where the 
freedom recognized to the parties gives them 
the necessary flexibility to mould their 
contractual relationship in order to better 
pursue their legitimate business objectives. 
The Advocate general efforts consist in striking a 
balance between the two bodies of law, 
sometimes considered conflicting, and proposes 
the following answers: 
1) “The fact that a holder of a standard-essential patent 
(SEP) which has given a commitment to a 
standardization body to grant third parties a license on 
                                                 
51 Advocate general opinion point 32. 
52 The intermingled relationship between intellectual 
property law and competition law is thoroughly dug in 
the book by CAGGIANO, MUSCOLO, TAVASSI (eds), 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property. A European 
Perspective, The Hague, 2012, and thoroughly explored by 
ULLRICH, Approaching a patent law problem via competition 
policy in The interaction between competition law and intellectual 
property law, European Competition Law Annual 2005 
(editors Ehlermann, Atanasiu), Oxford 2007, 305 ff. 
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FRAND terms makes a request for corrective 
measures or brings an action for a prohibitory injunction 
against an infringer, in accordance with Artt.10 and 
11 of Directive 2004/48/ of 29, April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, which may 
lead to the exclusion from the markets covered by the 
standard of the products and services supplied by the 
infringer of an SEP, constitutes an abuse of its 
dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU where it is 
shown that the SEP-holder has not honored its 
commitment even though the infringer has shown itself to 
be objectively ready, willing and able to conclude such a 
licensing agreement. 
2) Compliance with that commitment means that, prior 
to seeking corrective measures or bringing an action for a 
prohibitory injunction, the SEP-holder, if it is not to be 
deemed to be abusing its dominant position, must - 
unless it has been established that the alleged infringer is 
fully aware of the infringement - alert the alleged 
infringer to that fact in writing, giving reasons, and 
specifying the SEP concerned and the manner in which 
it has been infringed by the infringer. The SEP-holder 
must, in any event, present to the alleged infringer a 
written offer of a license on FRAND terms which 
contains all the terms normally included in a license in 
the sector in question, in particular the precise amount 
of the royalty and the way in which that amount is 
calculated. 
3) The infringer must respond to that offer in a diligent 
and serious manner. If it does not accept the SEP-
holder’s offer, it must promptly present to the latter, in 
writing, a reasonable counter-offer relating to the clauses 
with which it disagrees. The making of a request for 
corrective measures or the bringing of an action for a 
prohibitory injunction does not constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position if the infringer’s conduct is purely 
tactical and/or dilatory and/or not serious. 
4) If negotiations are not commenced or are unsuccessful, 
the conduct of the alleged infringer cannot be regarded as 
dilatory or as not serious if it requests that FRAND 
terms be fixed either by a court or by an arbitration 
tribunal. In that event, it is legitimate for the SEP-
holder to ask the infringer either to provide a bank 
guarantee for the payment of royalties or to deposit a 
provisional sum at the court or arbitration tribunal in 
respect of its past and future use of the patent. 
5) Nor can an infringer’s conduct be regarded as 
dilatory or as not serious during the negotiations for a 
FRAND license if it reserves the right, after concluding 
an agreement for such a license, to challenge before a 
court or arbitration tribunal the validity of that patent, 
its supposed use of the teaching of the patent and the 
essential nature of the SEP in question”. 
11. CONCLUSION 
It is doubtful whether the Commission has 
extensively weighted the hidden risk behind its 
approach, that is a reduction of patent owners’ 
incentives to license patents outside the pool. 
Furthermore the grounds upon which the 
technology pools fall outside the realm of 
TTBER are not explained by the Commission. 
It seems that, from one side, for what concerns 
the agreement setting up the pool, its object is 
not the “production” of products made on the 
basis of technology under license and, from the 
other, that for what concerns the agreements 
between the pool and its licensees quite always 
they constitute a multiparty agreement (art.1.1 
lett. c(1) Reg. n.316). The first assumption 
deserves a short comment: the production of 
“contract products” may intervene “directly or 
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indirectly” as set forth in art. 1.1. lett g Reg. 
n.316: to give a sense to this statement we must 
admit that production can be carried out by a 
third party without subverting the nature and 
purposes of the pool. 
As to the second conclusion, whenever the 
pool is a third and separate entity (agent) acting 
on behalf of the members (point 244 
Guidelines) the license agreement is entered 
into between two parties, thus cannot be 
identified with a multilateral agreement. 
The question is whether for a better legal 
environment of business men ( in the particular 
perspective) it is more suitable to have the 
pools governed by a TTBER or to leave them 
outside. The stakeholders reports on the 
consultation show they were quite happy of the 
situation as it was at the time, mainly because 
they could enjoy more flexibility than that 
allowed by the conditions and limitations laid 
down in a TTBER. Furthermore no severe 
critiques were raised on the principles 
contained in the 2004 Guidelines. 
The much awaited Huawei holding was 
pronounced on July 16, 201553. The Court tried 
to strike a balance between the IPR protection 
and competition law including the possibility of 
access to a standard for newcomers. 
The Court of Justice starts re-affirming that for 
the IPR owner the exercise of such right 
                                                 
53 For a first comment see BANASEVIC, The Implication of 
the Court of Justice’s Huawei/ZTE Judgment, in 6 Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice, 2015, 7; LO BUE, 
Huawei v. ZTE: Open Issues after ECJ’s Judgment, in 
Osservatorio permanente sull’applicazione delle regole della 
concorrenza, Agosto 2015. 
cannot in itself constitute an abuse of dominant 
position (§ 46), which is in line also with the 
Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, but substitutes the 
exception of “exceptional circumstances” (applied 
in the judgments Volvo, McGill, IMS) with the new 
concept of “legitimate expectations” (§ 53) that the 
alleged infringer of an IPR has when the IPR 
owner has signed a FRAND agreement with the 
Standard Setting Organization (SSO). The basic 
assumption is that if the IPR owner seeks an 
injunction without observing the FRAND 
obligations it commits an abuse of dominant 
position. The core part of Huawei holding is 
devoted to explain how should be interpreted 
the FRAND commitments, from both sides 
(IPR owner and alleged infringer) considering 
that the FRAND terms are generic and flexible. 
Following to a great extent the conclusions of 
the Advocate General, the court holds that: 
“ 1. Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as 
meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a 
standard established by a standardisation body, which 
has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to 
grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse 
its dominant position, within the meaning of that 
article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking 
an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent 
or seeking the recall of products for the manufacture of 
which that patent has been used, as long as: 
– prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, 
alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement 
complained about by designating that patent and 
specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, 
secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its 
willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on 
FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, 
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written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in 
particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be 
calculated, and 
– where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent 
in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently 
responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised 
commercial practices in the field and in good faith, this 
being a matter which must be established on the basis of 
objective factors and which implies, in particular, that 
there are no delaying tactics. 
2. Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not 
prohibiting, in circumstances such as those in the main 
proceedings, an undertaking in a dominant position and 
holding a patent essential to a standard established by a 
standardisation body, which has given an undertaking 
to the standardisation body to grant licences for that 
patent on FRAND terms, from bringing an action for 
infringement against the alleged infringer of its patent 
and seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past 
acts of use of that patent or an award of damages in 
respect of those acts of use.”. 
It is disappointing that the Court did not 
address the question (it was the right occasion) 
whether a SEP owner is in a dominant position 
(leaving it to the referring national Court), but 
we appreciate that it stressed in particular the 
“willingness to conclude a license agreement” 
test on the part of the alleged infringer, and 
clarified how should the FRAND terms be 
interpreted, thus overcoming the patent crisis 
fight between the IPR owner and the 
prospective licensees54.  
                                                 
54 On the much debated relationship between the IPR 
protection and the competition policy let me refer to the 
recent surveys of OSTI, Ma a che serve l’antitrust ?, in Foro 
it., 2015, V, 114 ff., and VAN DEN BERGH, 
 
  
                                                 
GIANNACCARI, L’approccio più economico nel diritto 
comunitario della concorrenza. Il più è troppo o non (ancora) 
abbastanza?, in Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2014, 393 ff. 
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